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Abstract
The study proposes a novel way to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks taking
into account time-varying signals of the central bank. I augment the standard monetary
policy Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) with additional information variables from
Fed statements, which allows us to study the information-free effects of monetary policy
shocks and to take into account forward-looking information released by the central bank.
The results show that, compared to surprises in 3-month federal funds futures, the policy
shock identified in this study has a more negative effect on GDP, a more prolonged negative
effect on inflation and a greater impact effect on the excess bond premium. In the short-run
it causes S&P500 to decline and the Fed to raise its interest rate. Furthermore, the results
of large-scale Bayesian VAR confirm the standard transmission channels of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
How does monetary policy affect the economy? To answer this question it is necessary to
find an effective means of analysing the effects of monetary policy shocks due to the fact
that the Fed reacts to macroeconomic indicators and shocks should be orthogonal to this re-
action. The principal empirical strategies lie in purging a monetary policy instrument from
the reaction function (Romer & Romer (2004)) or employing high-frequency identification
(Gertler & Karadi (2015)). Nevertheless, recent studies have pointed out that the effect
of the information in central bank communications might invalidate even high-frequency
identification (Steinsson (2019), Jarocinski & Karadi (2020), Hansen & McMahon (2016)
among others).
The main concern with high-frequency identification lies in the fact that the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) might possess insider information (Romer & Romer
(2000)), as a consequence of which FOMC statements might release this private informa-
tion or time-varying preferences of the central bank to the public. The reaction in a narrow
window around Fed announcement could well contain a response to this additional informa-
tion rather than a response to unexpected monetary policy action by the Fed. Therefore,
the response in 3-month federal funds futures would not be a causal consequence of a mon-
etary policy action itself. In line with that, Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2014) found that
shocks identified by purging can be predicted from macroeconomic indicators (from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (2019)), while shocks identified by high-frequency strategy can be
predicted from Greenbook Historical and Forecast Data (2019) projections.
Moreover, literature still lacks a good measure of monetary policy shock. Popular ap-
proaches rely on purging suitable proxies with respect to Fed private forecasts (Romer &
Romer (2004), Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2014)) or on augmenting VAR with forward-
looking information emanating from Federal Reserve forecasts (Bu et al. (2020)). Never-
theless, these approaches are also problematic because Fed forecasts are not available to
the public in real-time (as was pointed out by Ramey (2016)) and, therefore, the “cor-
rect” reactions of macroeconomic variables to a “monetary policy shock” in this case are
puzzling because there is still unresolved signal-extraction problem by the public. Using
information released in policy statements instead of Fed private forecasts helps to overcome
above-mentioned problems and at the same time to purge monetary policy surprises.
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This paper provides original empirical evidence regarding the information contained in
FOMC statements. Identifying the type of information inherent in “policy surprises” en-
ables these surprises to be decomposed into information and information-free policy effects.
I use FOMC statements as the main data source for 1994–2016 because the Fed started
to release statements from 1994. I employ Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) pre-trained
on the business sections of main U.S. newspapers for content extraction from the FOMC
statements, which transforms Fed statements into topics distributions over time. Following
that, I adopt a lexical-based approach to assign the tone to each sentence from the FOMC
statements, which counts the frequency of positive/negative and uncertain words in each
sentence. These topic time series are employed to identify the types of information that are
important for surprise changes in the 3-month federal funds futures on FOMC statement
release dates. I use Bayesian Lasso regression for this purpose.
Furthermore, the study decomposes federal funds future surprises on FOMC dates into
information and information-free shocks by augmenting the standard VAR with information
variables, which enable us to separate the Fed information effects from a pure policy shock.
For this purpose, I use the data from Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) on 3-month federal funds
futures and S&P500 surprises in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement, as
well as the main macroeconomic indicators employed in Vector Autoregressions (VAR) by
Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) to make the findings comparable.
The main results are as follows. The most important news released by the central bank
concern the macroeconomy. The positivity of these signals lead to an increase in short-
term nominal daily yields, while signals concerning macroeconomic uncertainty increase
long-term daily nominal and real yields, as well as expected inflation. These fiddlings
are also in line with those of Hansen et al. (2019). The result confirms that central bank
communication is a multi-dimensional object and affects the economy in different directions.
The conventional way of identifying monetary policy shocks in the literature is to rotate
principal components around monetary policy announcements to capture target and path
factors of monetary policy, as was first introduced by the excellent work of Gürkaynak et al.
(2005). Derived path factor should capture communication channel of monetary policy
that influence long-term rates mainly through the term premium. My findings show that
this path factor might capture central bank uncertain signals concerning future economic
development. These signals are important for the long tails of nominal and real yield curves.
The paper introduces a novel way to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks
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conditional on information released by the central bank in its statements. The popular
approach is to purge suitable surprise components with respect to Fed private forecasts
(Romer & Romer (2004), Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2014)). But this approach has two
major issues. Firstly, why to do conditioning on Fed private forecasts that are unavailable
to the public in real-time? In this case, there is still a signal extraction problem by the
public and the “standard” reactions of output and inflation are questionable1. Secondly
and more importantly, recent literature questions the information advantages of the Fed2.
An alternative explanation is that the Fed releases its time-varying reaction function to the
public and from its statements the public learns it and updates expectations accordingly.
In this case, it is reasonable to conditioning on central bank signals3 instead of internal
forecasts. Moreover, Gürkaynak et al. (2020) shows that based on the comments in the
financial press, latent factors that explain most of the variation of the yield curve are
indeed days of well-known “statement surprises”.
After augmenting VAR with these news series the results show that a policy shock has
a more negative effect on GDP and more prolonged negative effect on inflation compared
to the baseline results. In the short-run it causes S&P500 to decline and the Fed to raise
its interest rate. What is more, it rises the cost of credit on impact.
The results contribute to the literature on the transmission channel of monetary policy.
The results of large-scale Bayesian VAR show that a monetary policy shock is transmitted
according to the theory: it reduces real economic activity, inflation, credit spreads, while
increases interest rates, the cost of credit and macroeconomic uncertainty. The results also
confirm the importance of interest rate, credit, exchange rate, asset prices and expecta-
tions channels of monetary policy propagation. However, contrary to previous findings, I
could not confirm the importance of the term premium channel for monetary policy shocks
propagation.
The findings add to the results of Jarocinski & Karadi (2020), who employed sign
restrictions to identify the monetary policy and information effects of the central bank.
The effect of policy surprise shocks are in line with the main findings of Jarocinski &
Karadi (2020): the effect is less persistent on interest rates but more persistent on inflation
1As was pointed out by Ramey (2016)
2See, for instance, Michael D. Bauer and Eric T. Swanson (2020)
3Delphic forward guidance by Campbell et al. (2012)
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and the cost of credit. Therefore, I relaxed sign restrictions and obtained quantitatively
similar results.
Moreover, the study extends the findings of Romer & Romer (2000) on asymmetric
information between the Federal Reserve and the public. My findings show that FOMC
statements provide additional information which goes beyond the monetary policy actions
themselves, but this information also should be well anticipated by markets. Therefore, the
central bank might release time-varying policy preferences to the public in its communica-
tions instead of new information about economic development.
The information shock, identified in this study, has an expansionary effect on the econ-
omy as in Steinsson (2019), who showed that a contractionary monetary policy shock from
high-frequency identification has an expansionary effect on output growth expectations.
Hubert (2019) found that contractionary monetary policy has negative effects on inflation
expectations and stock prices only if and when associated with positive economic news.
This study could not confirm this finding. Moreover, Iglesias et al. (2017) found that nei-
ther positive nor negative communication had particularly significant effects on inflation
nor real economic activity, whereas Hubert & Labondance (2017) found that sentiment
affects private interest rate expectations, inflation and industrial production beyond mone-
tary shocks. On the contrary, this study finds that communication mainly reduces the cost
of credit.
The study expands the literature on the importance of FOMC statements. For instance,
Gürkaynak et al. (2020) show that when a sample includes statements the heteroskedasticity-
based estimator yields a reaction coefficient that is two to 400 times larger than the OLS
estimator without statements.
Last but not least, this study complements the recent literature in its way of decom-
posing FOMC statements into topic time series with sentiments. To the author’s best
knowledge this is the first study to employ a pre-trained LDA model for decomposing the
sentences from FOMC statements into economic topic time series. Hansen et al. (2019)
used Bank of England Inflation reports and treated each paragraph as a document in LDA.
Similarly, Hansen & McMahon (2016) trained the LDA model on sentences from FOMC
statements. Subsequently, the previously-cited authors assigned the tone to each topic.
My approach differs from the above-mentioned in that the LDA model was trained on the
business section of a selection of U.S. newspapers, which enables us to obtain more distin-
guishable topics. What is more, my methodology captures changes in the topic composition
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of FOMC statements without the need to rely on the dynamic topic model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology. Section 3 discusses the information content of Fed communication. Section
4 discusses the mechanism of central bank communication effects. Section 5 presents the
main results on the transmission mechanism of the information-free effect of monetary
policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) holds eight regularly scheduled meetings
during the year and additional meetings as needed. In these meetings the Federal Open
Market Committee decides on the interest rate changes necessary for adjusting inflation.
Beginning with the 1994 meetings, the FOMC Secretariat started to release FOMC state-
ments to the public (Federal Open Market Committee: Transcripts and other historical
materials (2019)). Federal Open Market Committee statements for 1994–2020 used in this
study were downloaded from the Fed webpage.
The standard high-frequency identification strategy employs a narrow window (30 min-
utes) in order to detect surprise changes in 3-month federal funds futures around FOMC
announcements. The main concern with this identification strategy lies in the fact that the
FOMC might possess insider information (Romer & Romer (2000)), and FOMC announce-
ments might contain additional information for the public or it might reveal its time-varying
preferences. The reaction in a narrow window might contain a response to this additional
information rather than a response to unexpected monetary policy action. This might in-
validate the interpretation of the results based on high-frequency identification since it is
not possible to distinguish the effect of monetary policy shocks from information shocks.
Following the previous logic, Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2014) found that the surprises
highlighted in Gertler & Karadi (2015) can be predicted from from Greenbook Historical
and Forecast Data (2019) projections and Federal Reserve Economic Data (2019) factors.
The authors purged the shock series with respect to their own lags and Greenbook informa-
tion4. Nevertheless, these surprises may, in fact, be attributed to revelation of time-varying
preference of the central bank. In this case, purging shock series with respect to Greenbook
4As in Romer & Romer (2004)
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information might not capture this additional information. Therefore, I purge shock series
with respect to topics from FOMC statements. These topics and the tone of the Fed should
serve to capture the Fed information effect and allows to separate pure monetary policy
shocks from information shocks.
I use the data from Jarocinski & Karadi (2020), who decomposed surprise and informa-
tion shocks from surprises in 3-month federal funds futures and stock prices around FOMC
announcement using sign restrictions. However, in order to obtain more accurate results
when purging surprises in federal funds futures from the information effect, I add additional
informational proxies to the standard SVAR, which allows us to separate these surprises
from the effects of information.
To train a model for the topic extraction, details of which are presented below, I use the
Nexis Uni database from where I extracted daily business news from The New York Times
(1980–2019), The Washington Post (1981–2019), The Los Angeles Times (1985–2019) and
The Chicago Tribune (1985–2019). The New York Times is the second-largest in circulation
and the largest circulating metropolitan newspaper with a weekly circulation of 2.1 million.
It is also ranked 18th in terms of world circulation. The Los Angeles Times is the fourth-
largest US newspaper by circulation, The Chicago Tribune is the sixth- and The Washington
Post is the seventh-largest by circulation. The total timespan is 1980:M6–2019:M7.
Following Shapiro et al. (2017) I filtered out the news that does not contain one of the
following words: said, says, told, stated, wrote, reported. After imposing these criteria, the
data pull yielded approximately 416,000 articles.
Following Larsen & Thorsrud (2019), I employ Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (in-
troduced by Blei et al. (2003)) for topic extraction. The LDA is a probabilistic graphical
model that is based on the bag-of-words assumption, that is the word order does not mat-
ter. If one mixes words in an article and employs the LDA it leads to the same results as
without mixing. For extracting news topics with Latent Dirichlet Allocation standard text
processing steps are employed:
• Words from a stoplist are excluded. This list contains common words that contribute
little meaning to the documents, such as prepositions, conjunctions, and pronouns.
• Words are reduced to their word root form. Example: economy, economic, economical,
economics, economise are reduced to the root form econom.
• Rare and frequent words are removed
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• Vocabulary consists of 57,990 unique words.
LDA is a mixed-membership directed probabilistic graphical model for a text corpus.
The generative process for a document collection D under the LDA model is as follows
(Darling (2011)):
1. For each topic k = 1, ...,K (K is the total number of latent topics):
• A discrete probability distribution over a fixed vocabulary that represents the kth
topic distribution, ϕk ∼ Dirichlet(β)
5
2. For each document d ∈ D (D is the total number of documents):
• A document-specific distribution over the available topics (per-document topic
proportion), θd ∼ Dirichlet(α)
6
• For each word wn ∈ d (N is the total number of words):
(a) Per-word topic assignment (shows which topic generated the word instance
wd,n), zd,n ∼ Mult(θd)
7
(b) An observed word, wd,n ∼ Mult(ϕk)
The joint probability for LDA takes the form (2):
p(wd,n, zd,n, θd, ϕk|α, β) = (
N∏
n=1
p(zd,n|θd)p(wd,n|zd,n, ϕn,k))(
K∏
k=1
p(ϕk|β))(
D∏
d=1
p(θd|α))
= (
N∏
n=1
Mult(zd,n|θd)Mult(wd,n|zd,n, ϕd,k))(
K∏
k=1
Dirichlet(ϕk|β))(
D∏
d=1
Dirichlet(θd|α)) (1)
where, p(wd,n, zd,n, θd, ϕk|α, β) is the posterior from the LDA model.
Latent variables zd,n, θd, ϕk are unobserved. Inference is done via Collapsed Gibbs
Sampling (Griffiths & Steyvers (2004)) with α = 50 and β = 0.01. Since for the inference
of both θd and ϕk it is sufficient to know just zd,n, Collapsed Gibbs Sampling is based
on integrating out the multinomial parameters and simply sampling zd,n (see Griffiths &
Steyvers (2004) for the detailed treatment). The outcomes of the algorithm are topic
distributions θd and word distributions per topic ϕk.
5Dirichlet(.) is the Dirichlet distribution (a conjugate prior for the Multinomial distribution), β is a hyper-
parameter
6α is a hyper-parameter.
7Mult(.) is the Multinomial distribution.
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The optimal number of topics for LDA was chosen based on coherence values. The
topics are considered to be coherent if all or most of the words, for example, the topic’s
top N words, are related. Coherence values for different numbers of topics are presented
in Figure A.1. According to the coherence values, the optimal number of topics is 40. All
topics from the LDA model are interpretable and are shown in Figure 1, whereas Table A.1
shows word distributions for each topic.
Larsen & Thorsrud (2019) in their study implemented sign adjustment (positive versus
negative news) to news topics. However, as was pointed out by Sims (2003), the tone of
economic reporting affects sentiment beyond the economic information contained in report-
ing itself (which was explored in the study of Shapiro et al. (2017)). Therefore, I take into
account both the statement’s topic and its sentiments.
To assign a sentiment for each FOMC statement I employ a dictionary of Loughran &
Mcdonald (2016) with a negation rule (details are discussed in Appendix B). This approach
relates to Shapiro et al. (2017), where the authors found that a combination of different
dictionaries with a negation rule is closer to human judgements with regard to labelling
sentiment.
The positive sentiment of a sentence is calculated as following (2):
Posi =
#positivewordsi −#negativewordsi
#totalwordsi
(2)
The total monthly positive sentiment for a specific economic topic is calculated as the
sum of sentence positive sentiments minus negative sentiments multiplied by topic propor-
tions within the sentence and sum over the sentences (3):
Postopic =
∑
i∈topic
Posi × topic proportionsi (3)
where topic proportionsi is the proportions of the topics in a sentence that is above a
threshold (details can be found in Appendix B).
Similarly, I calculated uncertainty sentiments by employing (2) and (3) for uncertain
words from Loughran & Mcdonald (2016)8.
In order to purge monetary policy shock series with respect to central bank signals I
augment the standard VAR with information variables.
The standard Structural VAR representation in companion form is:
Ayt = Bxt−1 + εt (4)
8The full list of words for each sentiment category is available at https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/resources/
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, where x
′
t = [1, y
′
t−1, y
′
t−2, ..., y
′
t−k] and εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, D), D is diagonal, yt is k × 1 vector
of endogenous variables, εt is k× 1 vector of exogenous random shocks. A and B are k× k
coefficient matrices.
The reduced form representation is:
yt = A
−1Bxt−1 +A
−1εt
yt = Cxt−1 + ǫt (5)
where C = A−1B and ǫ are k × 1 vector of reduced form shocks, which don’t have any
economic interpretation.
Infinite MA representation of (5) is:
yt =
∞∑
j=0
Θjεt−j (6)
The identification problem to (6) comes from two sources. First one is the regular
identification problem: recovering structural shocks from (6) by imposing restrictions on A
matrix and variance-covariance matrix of residuals. These helps to overcome the observation
equivalent problem of:
yt =
∞∑
j=0
(ΘjU
−1)(Uεt−j)
yt =
∞∑
j=0
Θ∗jε
∗
t−j (7)
When decision’s maker information set is different from econometrician information set
the second problem of non-uniqueness arises:
H∗(z)Eε∗ε∗
′
H∗(z−1)
′
= H(z)Eεε
′
H(z−1)
′
(8)
where H(z) is the z-transform. The (8) shows two observatory equivalent results, one of
which is invertible representations and other is non-invertible. If A−1 is equal to H∗(z) then
standard identification by imposing restrictions in A matrix recovers ε∗ structural shock:
yt = A
−1Bxt−1 +A
−1ε∗t
Identifying A−1 recovers the shocks ε∗t , but not the structural shocks εt, that agents
observe since the econometrician conditions on a smaller information set than do agents
(Leeper et al. (2013)). Moreover, there should not be foresight effects in VAR. Therefore,
augmenting VAR with additional information variables that are forward-looking should help
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to overcome the invertibility problem of VAR. What is more, these information variables
are available to the public in real-time and it is more reasonable to take this information
into account instead of conditioning on the Fed information set that is not available to the
public.
Noh (2018) suggested to use proxy variables as additional regressors in the VAR instead
of using proxy variables as IV for a shock identification assuming the invertibility condition,
because the Proxy-SVAR, which is the most efficient approach under the invertibility and
linearity, is valid if and only if the pre-whitened proxy variable has no direct forecasting
ability if it is added in the VAR. It is well-known that surprises in 3-m federal funds fu-
tures on FOMC announcements dates contain forward guidance effects and, therefore, have
forecasting power for future interest rate changes. That is why instead of using surprises
in 3-m federal funds futures as a proxy variable and assume invertibility of VAR, I use
it as an additional regressor in the conventional monetary VAR. This is “internal instru-
ment” approach, also pointed out by Plagborg-Mollerand & Wolf (2019), who highlighted
that structural estimation with an instrument (proxy) can be carried out by ordering the
instrument first in a recursive VAR, even under non-invertibility9.
There are some implicit assumptions while using surprises around FOMC announce-
ments to measure the effect of monetary policy shocks, namely (1) there is only one event
in a selected window; (2) markets know exactly data-generating process and information of
the central bank, (3) markets know exactly the central bank reaction function; (4) efficient
market hypothesis; (5) a risk premium does not change in a window. Moreover, foresight
should be already taken into account by markets. In this case, asset price changes in a
window around an announcement can be represented as:
pht − p
h
t−30min = [Et(it+h)− Et−30min(it+h)] + [ζt − ζt−30min]
pht − p
h
t−30min = [Et(it+h)− Et−30min(it+h)] = ep + error
where the first part in brackets is a revision of expectations and the second is a revision of
a term premium.
A shock is an innovation orthogonal to the state of the economy and a surprise is an
innovation orthogonal to the public information set. In case the Fed has an information
9For instance, Durante et al. (2020) used poor man’s proxy of surprises as a policy shock measure in the framework
of Jorda local projections.
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advantage over markets, agents’ update of forecasts during an announcement can confound
ep with the reaction function of the central bank, which gives a reason to purge surprises
with respect to the central bank information set. However, in case the Fed does not have
an information advantage over markets, but signalling its time-varying preferences then
purging surprises with respect to the central bank information set would not clean them
form information effects.
3 Information content of Fed communication
The pre-trained LDA model can be used to classify new documents. It decomposes any new
document into forty topics by assigning topic proportions that sum up to one. Therefore,
any document can be represented as forty topic proportions. These proportions should
capture the meaning of a document. Appendix C presents the results for labelling topics
for FOMC statements separated into paragraphs and sentences. Topic distributions for
the most part correctly capture the meanings of each sentence and paragraph. Moreover,
aggregated topic distributions over all the documents are approximately the same as if
I were to assign a topic based on the threshold 0.3 for each sentence and 0.25 for each
paragraph (see Figure C.29, Figure C.30 and Figure C.31).
Figure 1 shows aggregated topic distributions over all the documents with topics assigned
for each sentence. Based on the results, the Fed provides the greatest amount of information
on its monetary policy (topic: Fed), economic conditions (topics: Economic, Economics),
federal committee regulations (topic: Rules), interest rates setting (topic: Rates), reporting
(topic: Reports), job market conditions (topic: Jobs), asset market (topics: Investing,
Securities), budget (topics: Income, Taxes, Budget, Spendings), and oil/gas (topics: Gas,
Energy, Oil prices, etc.).
These topics are in line with types of information the Fed usually releases in its state-
ments. Infrequent and non-intuitive topics might reflect changes in information that the
Fed releases. For instance, the Health topic time series is important when the Fed talks
about the effect of Coronavirus in its statements; the Food topic time series highlights peri-
ods when the Fed talks about food prices; the Computers topic time series might pin down
words about monitor or monitoring in the Fed statements; the Housing topic time series
might indicate periods when the Fed talks about house prices, etc.
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Figure 1: Topic proportions of statements by each sentence
The topic decompositions for FOMC statements over time show that from 2008 the
FOMC started to rely more on communications (Figure D.7). That is fully in line with
the fact that the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound and the FOMC started to use
unconventional monetary policy tools. The Fed started to communicate more frequently
about its monetary policy, but also about economic conditions, its interest rate settings,
jobs, rules, reports, securities and investment.
The distribution of topics, however, is not constant over time. The FOMC releases more
information concerning debt and loans from 2008, and about stocks and jobs from 2010.
Additionally, the Fed communicates more frequently on its interest rates policy from 2012
(Figure D.7). Moreover, the tone of the Fed during economic recessions is generally more
negative (Appendix D).
Figure D.8 and Figure D.9 present tone adjusted separate topic time series. Figure 2
reports on changes in topic proportions in Fed statements over time. For instance, the Fed
started to signal more regarding jobs, budget, securities, shock market, investing, housing,
credit and rates after the funds rate hit the zero lower bound. The rates topic reflects that
the Fed started to explain more its interest rate setting decisions, topics concerning budget,
securities, shock market, investing, housing, credit might reflect the use unconventional
monetary policy tools, while the topic concerning jobs should provide information for the
public about future labor market conditions. Therefore, topic time series provide evidence
that the Fed started to rely more on communications strategies during unconventional
times.
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(a) Changes after 2008
(b) QE dates compared to others
(c) QE dates compared to after 2008
Figure 2: Topic proportions over time
The methodology allows to identify topics connected with quantitative easing announce-
ments of the central bank. Figure 2 shows that on dates of these announcements the Fed
signaled more on debt, stock market, securities, credit, budget, housing.
I use the information contained in the FOMC statements to decompose monetary pol-
icy surprises into information and policy shocks. Surprises are changes in the federal funds
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futures on the dates of announcements in a narrow time window around these announce-
ment10. To decompose surprises into information and non-information components I need
to select the topics that are important for these surprises. Each FOMC statement is decom-
posed into 40 topics but not all information is relevant for the public. I use a Bayesian Lasso
regression (Park & Casella (2008)) for topic selections. For this purpose all non-stationary
topic time series were transformed into a stationary form by taking first differences. All
series were standardised for Lasso regression.
Figure 3 presents the Bayesian Lasso for 40 topics time series from FOMC statements.
It shows the proportions of samples when each topic was selected. The total number of
MCMC samples is 10,000. It is necessary to set a threshold for selecting the most important
topics. In this instance, I use the threshold 0.65, selecting the topics that were included in
at least 6,500 MCMC samples.
The topics that are found to be important for predicting Fed “surprises” are fully in
line with what one would expect. These surprises are predicted from economic, credit,
economics, international, company news, investing and deals topics. The result is robust
also with regard to important topic time series for the first principal component of the
surprises in fed funds futures and eurodollar futures with one year or less to expiration.
Importance of topics on economic issues might contain the Fed information effect. For
instance Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) found that a difference between the staff and private
forecasts for one-quarter-ahead real GDP growth influences the central bank information
shocks significantly.
Employing sign adjustment for topics from FOMC statements instead of tone adjustment
leads to similar results, namely the topics Economic, Economics, Cities, Deals are important
for surprises in federal funds futures on the FOMC statements release dates (Figure E.1).
10Usually it is a 30-minutes window around the announcement time.
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Figure 3: Bayesian Lasso for surprises in 3m federal funds futures (top) and the first principal
component of the surprises in fed funds futures and eurodollar futures with one year or less to
expiration (bottom)
The Fed does not talk about cities in its statements, rather Cities is purely a label
to serve as a topic for the distribution of words. The topic Cities represents sentences
that contain a particular combination of words, such as: citi, build, develop, offic, area,
project, project, real, properti, million, estat, space, plan, squar, washington, district,
construct, park, street, local, leas, counti, feet, downtown, rent, land, region, commun,
includ, commerci. It does not necessarily need to contain information about cities per
se, but there might be information concerning development, projects, etc. This topic is
quite infrequent in FOMC statements (Figure 2). Similarly, the topic Cars is not limited
exclusively to cars, but also covers car, sale, auto, vehicle, ford, year, motor, chrysler,
truck, model, gm, gener, compani, dealer, market, product, automak, plant, industri, sold,
sell, toyota, maker, unit, detroit, driver, incent, american, part, engin. This topic is also
infrequent in FOMC statements.
The topics relating to trade and industry which contain uncertainty sentiments are also
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found to be important for surprises in Federal funds futures (Figure E.1). Furthermore,
the topics Computers, Economic, Health, Trade, Industry, Cities, Services, Investing and
Deals are found to be important for Gertler & Karadi (2015) proxy for surprises in federal
funds futures (Figure E.1).
Figure 4 sheds a light on asymmetric effects of Fed information on surprises in federal
funds futures and S&P500 in a narrow window around announcements. Surprises in federal
funds futures are more susceptible to negative Fed signals on economy, credit, economics
and investing, while surprises in S&P500 are influenced by positive signals concerning the
Fed, health, stocks and securities, and by negative signals on credit, trade and currency.
In line with logic, surprises in S&P react more on signals about stock markets, whereas
surprises in federal funds futures on signals about the economy.
Figure 4: Bayesian Lasso for surprises in 3m federal funds futures (top) and S&P500 (bottom).
Asymmetric effects of information
Figure E.2, Figure E.3, Figure E.4, Figure E.5 discuss further asymmetric effects of
central bank statements.
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4 Mechanism of Central Bank Communication ef-
fects
The previous section stated that information released by the central bank in its statements is
important for expectations revisions by the public. But what is the channel of propagation
of central bank communication on the economy? Central bank communication aims to
shape agents expectations of future interest rates and economic conditions, and, therefore,
communication should affect through expectation revisions. However, Hansen et al. (2019)
showed that news on economic uncertainty can have increasingly large effects along the yield
curve. The authors argued that these central bank’s signals that drive long-run interest
rates do not affect short-run rates and operate primarily through the term premium and
have an effect through shaping perceptions of long-run uncertainty.
Firstly, I argue that the central bank sends signals about current macroeconomic condi-
tions and, therefore, it is plausible to take them into account in the standard VAR instead
of conditioning on central bank information set, which is unavailable to the public in real-
time. I show that central bank communication can be predicted from forward-looking
financial market variables. As forward-looking variables, I use changes between FOMC
meetings in nominal effective exchange rate (∆ NEER) for USA and Euro, TED Spread
(∆ TEDRATE), which is calculated as the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on U.S.
dollars, and Moody’s Seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity (∆ AAA10Y and BAA10Y). Series were downloaded
from Federal Reserve Economic Data (2019).
Table E.1, Table E.2, Table E.3, Table E.4 report results of predictive regressions for
all forty topic time series from FOMC statements. I concentrate on topic time series from
FOMC statements that are (1) connected to news about the economy, (2) important for
surprises in the federal funds futures in a narrow window around announcements, and that
are not important for surprises in S&P500 during announcements. The topics are Economic,
Economics and Investing. Table E.1 and shows that the Economic topic from statements
is predicted from changes in the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based on U.S. dollars
and Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity. Both variables serve as indicators of credit risks. The Economics topic
from Fed statements can be predicted from changes in S&P500 (Table E.2), which is a stock
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market index that tracks 500 large companies. According to Table E.4 the Investing topic
from FOMC is also predicted from changes in the spread between 3-Month LIBOR based
on U.S. dollars. These results are in line with the recent findings of Beckers (2020), who
claimed that credit risk conditions enter the central bank reaction function.
Table 1 shows the connection between aggregated signals about the economy11 in FOMC
statements and surprises in 3-month federal fund futures around Fed announcements. In-
terestingly, R2 from these regressions are similar to R2 in the first stage regressions of
Miranda-Agrippino & Ricco (2014), who regressed surprises around FOMC announcements
on Fed private forecasts.
Table 1: Surprises in ffr futures
Dependent variable:
ffr hf ffr hf PCA
(1) (2)
Economic aggregated 1.696∗∗ 2.174∗∗
(0.831) (0.940)
Constant −0.002 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Observations 274 274
R2 0.098 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.083
Note: Newey-West HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Furthermore, it is important to investigate whether Fed signals are important for interest
rate changes. For this, I aggregate the topics Economy, Economic and Investing into one
and see if it has predictive power for interest rate changes around Fed announcements
days12. Table 2 reports on the importance of economic news signals sent by the Fed during
announcement days on daily changes in short-term rates. As a baseline, I use two-days
difference in short-term rates, i.e. one day after an announcement minus one day before
an announcement. That is because, as noted in the literature, markets might need time to
adjust for the information beyond the Fed action itself.
11I aggregate the topics Economy, Economic and Investing into one
12Daily yields are taken from Gürkaynak et al. (2007)
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Central bank’s signals about the economy in its statements are positively correlated with
changes in short-term yields. This might indicate the expectations channel of central bank
communication. Positive signals of central bank concerning the economy lead to a revision of
expectations by market participants. If central bank information set was the same as market
participants information these signals would not be important for markets. Moreover, these
signals can be predicted by forward-looking financial variables and according to the efficient
market hypothesis should already be taken into account by markets by release date.
Table 2: ∆ Yields, 2 days difference
Dependent variable:
1 year rate 1 year rate breakeven breakeven forward breakeven
∆ 1 day 5 years 2 years 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic aggregated 1.294∗ 1.733∗∗ −1.563 −2.260∗ −1.046
(0.757) (0.782) (1.134) (1.311) (0.684)
Constant 0.0004 −0.008 0.005 0.012∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 186 186 132 132 132
R2 0.039 0.048 0.036 0.054 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.042 0.028 0.046 0.022
Note: Newey-West HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reverse causality is not valid in this case, because the Fed should not react to previous
day yields in its statements. Moreover, the assumption of no omitted variable bias is not
too restrictive because usually there are no other events during the days of statements
releases. One concern is that markets react to unexpected actions of the central bank and
these actions are correlated with signals concerning the economy. But the more plausible
explanation, in this case, is that markets react to signals and to actions at the same time.
The latter claim was confirmed by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for instance.
Moreover, as was notices by Hansen et al. (2019), central bank signals are highly-
dimensional objects, which can affect the term premium as well. The authors pointed out
the importance of central bank signals concerning macroeconomic uncertainty. To study
this channel I use topic time series that were labelled with uncertainty sentiments instead of
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positivity/negativity. Moreover, I concentrate on topics concerning the economy, because
these topics should reflect central bank views about future macroeconomic conditions and,
therefore, these should be a source of important information for markets.
Appendix F reports on the predictive power of central bank uncertain signals concern-
ing the economy for the yield curve, Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) and
breakeven inflation rates13. Economic aggregated is the sum over uncertainties from the
Economic, Economics and Investing topics. I also control for uncertainties from the Fed
topic that should capture Odyssean forward guidance, where the Federal Reserve release
uncertainty concerning information about future monetary policy. Fed topic on FG dates
controls for this topic on days of forward guidance.
The results show that uncertainty concerning the economy released by the Fed in its
statements affects the long tail of the yield curve. That is in line with the finding of
Gürkaynak et al. (2020), who showed that a statement is more informative for longer ma-
turities. Uncertainty concerning the economy is positively connected with daily changes in
ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five and thirty years yields. The result is robust also for two
days changes in yields and also while controlling for surprises in federal funds futures. The
results are completely in line with those of Hansen et al. (2019), who found that long-run
interest rates respond to central bank communication, namely central bank uncertainty sig-
nals on economic development. The authors used the publication of the Bank of England’s
Inflation Report. The uncertainty signals that drive long-run interest rates do not affect
short-run rates and operate primarily through the term premium.
Central bank uncertain signals concerning the economy are also positively connected
with two five and ten years forward rates and with one-year forward rate four years ahead.
The result is also robust to controlling for a measure of surprises in federal funds futures
and to different ways of differencing dependent variables. Moreover, central bank uncertain
signals concerning the economy are positively connected to all curve of Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities, while surprises in federal funds futures on announcement days are not.
Therefore, uncertain signals concerning the economy released by the Fed in its statements
might affect the yield curve of real interest rates.
13Daily yields, TIPS and breakeven inflation rates are taken from Gürkaynak et al. (2007) and Gürkaynak et al.
(2010). Inflation compensation incorporate inflation risk premiums and the effects of the differential liquidity of
TIPS and nominal securities.
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Appendix F.2 presents the robustness check results where I include also a measure of
surprises in a narrow window around announcements14. All results concerning the impor-
tance central bank uncertain signals hold. Surprisingly enough, the measure of surprises
about future interest rates is neither connected with changes in yields of Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities, nor with daily changes in Inflation Compensation.
Appendix F.3 discusses bad controls and measurement errors issues. Measurement error
is a potential issue with the results because the coefficient of surprises in federal funds
futures is higher when I add my proxies for central bank uncertainty signals compared to
coefficients from univariate regressions. In this case, there might be a slight upward bias.
Bad controls situation occurs when potential outcome variables are used as controls in a
regression. I show that surprises in federal funds futures around announcements cannot be
outcome variables in a regression.
Hanson & Stein (2015) argue that news about short-term policy expectations is prop-
agated to longer-maturity bonds by the trading activity of yield-oriented investors. Ac-
cording to their model, decreases in short rates induce these investors to switch to longer-
maturity bonds, driving the yields on such bonds down through changes in the term pre-
mium. Hansen et al. (2019) found that central bank communication affects long-run interest
rates by providing news on risk and uncertainty around economic conditions, and thereby
generating a change in the long-run term premium. This channel operates not by chang-
ing long-run expectations of economic conditions, but by changing the perceived variance
of those conditions. Furthermore, the effect of uncertainty signals comes via the long-run
term premium, which can move independently of short-run expectations. My results con-
firm those of Hansen et al. (2019), central bank communication indeed affects market beliefs
about long-run uncertainty.
14Here I use the first principal component of surprises in the current month and 3-month fed funds futures and 2-,
3-, and 4- quarters ahead 3-month eurodollar futures because it should capture more of forward guidance.
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5 Monetary policy vs. Information shocks
5.1 Baseline results
Following Jarocinski & Karadi (2020), I use Cholesky identification15 for monetary policy
shocks with Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) original variables in the following order: surprises
in 3-month federal funds futures, the one-year government bond yield, real GDP, GDP
deflator and the excess bond premium. To separate a pure monetary policy shock from
an information shock, I add additional information variables before surprises in 3-month
federal funds futures. The studied period is 1994:M3–2016:M12. Because the data are at
monthly frequency I use twelve lags in SVAR. Appendix G presents the SVAR estimation
details.
As information variables I select those that should capture the effects of information
about the economy, that are topics concerning economy, economics and investing. These
topics time series were selected based on following criteria: (1) they have high predic-
tive power for surprises in federal funds futures; (2) they are connected to news about
the economy as opposed to monetary policy decisions per se; (3) they are not connected
to quantitative easing announcements, which are mainly concerning debt, housing, stock
market and securities. Moreover, these topic time series affect the yield curve during the
announcement dates.
Figure 5 discusses the baseline results, focusing on three distinct types of shock. In
Panel (a) the surprises in 3-month Federal funds futures are ordered first; in Panel (b) the
information variables are ordered before the surprises in 3-month Federal funds futures;
while Panel (c) presents the difference between the two, which should capture information
effects.
The baseline results (Panel (a)) are fully in line with the results of Jarocinski & Karadi
(2020) and Gertler & Karadi (2015). Some difference in magnitudes might be explained
by their use of a different period of study as Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) used the period
from 1984 and employed Kalman filter and smoother for substituting the missing values
in surprises in 3-month Federal funds futures. Also, prior tightness parameters are a bit
different since I use tighter prior for lags further than the first one.
15The authors use Cholesky identification as alternative specifications to sign restrictions.
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The result of a small decline in S&P500 in a tight window can be explained in line
with Steinsson (2019), who stated that a pure tightening of monetary policy leads stock
prices to fall for two reasons: higher discount rates and lower output. The authors found
that if monetary policy conveys information about both future monetary policy and fu-
ture exogenous economic fundamentals, stock prices fall by lesser amount in response to
the FOMC announcement than to the shock without information about future exogenous
fundamentals.
Panel (b) presents the results for purged shocks, which should not contain the Fed
information effect. The results are similar to Jarocinski & Karadi (2020). The response
of the one year rate is more transitory than in Panel (a). The response of S&P500 is
negative for the first few months. The response of real GDP has greater magnitude and it
is more prolonged. Finally, the response of GDP deflator is more prolonged compared to the
results in Panel (a) with the consequence that the identified effect looks like a contractionary
monetary policy shock. For all these variables there is a higher posterior probability for a
contractionary response because even 90% posterior credible sets are below zero for a long
period. The response of the Excess Bond premium is also in line with the results Jarocinski
& Karadi (2020) - a contractionary monetary policy shock without an information effect
has a greater effect on the cost of credit with narrower credible sets, which lasts for almost
twelve months.
Panel (c) discusses the results for differences between two previous effects, which should
capture pure negative information shocks. The results are in line with those of Jarocinski &
Karadi (2020) and Steinsson (2019): the Fed information shock has a more prolonged but
muted effect on the one year rate, on S&P500 and real GDP. An interesting result is that
it has a large short-run effect on the EBP. So positive news contained in announcements
can reduce the costs of credit in the short-run.
Therefore, I studied the effect of information free policy shock without relying on sign
restrictions. Some differences in impulse responses from Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) ones
might be explained by (1) differences in the periods studied16, (2) and the identification
strategies for monetary policy and information shocks17.
16Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) dealt with missing values for the shocks series via Kalman filter and smoother.
17Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) employed sign restriction which is set identification while Cholesky is point identifi-
cation.
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Figure 5: Comparison between monetary policy and information shocks. 3m federal funds futures
shaded 5%,16%, 84% and 95% percentiles
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Figure 6 presents the robustness exercise with the log U.S. consumer price index and in-
dustrial production as proxies for inflation and economic activity. The results are completely
in line with the baseline results in Figure 5, namely industrial production and inflation de-
cline in response to a policy shock with higher posterior probability in case of controlling
for informational effects. The difference between information free policy shock and a policy
shock is visible the most in the Excess Bond premium, but differences in responses of real
economic activity are also distinguishable.
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Figure 6: Comparison between monetary policy and information shocks. 3m federal funds futures
shaded 5%,16%, 84% and 95% percentiles
Appendix H discusses the results of Forecast error variance decompositions to both
shocks and their difference. A pure monetary policy shock explains higher proportion of
the forecast error variance of the Excess Bond Premium during the whole period, higher
proportion of S&P500 just after the shock and higher proportion of GDP and industrial
production in the long-run. It also explains a lower share of the one-year rate on impact.
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Figure 7 shows the responses in surprises in 3-m federal funds futures and S&P500 to
information shocks. According to the theory, they should respond to information shocks
in the same direction. It is seen that mainly high-frequency surprises respond to a posi-
tive economic information shock as the theory predicts. This economic information might
capture the effects of Delphic forward guidance.
(a) Information shock 1
(b) Information shock 2
(c) Information shock 3
Figure 7: Information effects
5.2 Robustness analysis
For the robustness check I use the first principal component of surprises in the current
month and 3-month fed funds futures and 2-, 3-, and 4- quarters ahead 3-month eurodollar
futures (Jarocinski & Karadi (2020)).
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Figure 8: Comparison between monetary policy and information shocks. The first principal
component of the surprises in fed funds futures and eurodollar futures with one year or less to
expiration
shaded 16% and 84% percentiles
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I purge this series in a similar way to the previous one but use topics with tone ad-
justment that were found to be important for this principal component (Figure 3 bottom
panel). I also use a measure of the stock price surprises from Jarocinski & Karadi (2020),
which is the first principal component of the surprises in the S&P500, Nasdaq Composite
and Wilshire 5000. Figure 8 presents the results.
There are differences between these results and the baseline results from Figure 5. For
responses of industrial production and CPI there is a posterior probability mass that lies
within a region of positive values while looking at 68% credible sets. For a response of the
excess bond premium, there is a region of 90% posterior probability mass that takes negative
values. Adding information variables to VAR reduces these probabilities of incorrect impulse
responses and sharpens identification.
The results concerning the effect of information-free shock are similar to the results from
Figure 5, with the exception of a more muted response in inflation. The effects of a policy
shock on real GDP and one year rate are completely in line with the previous findings.
Another difference with previous findings lies in the information shock having a larger
effect on the one year rate. The magnitude of the effect of information shock is also larger
for S&P500 and real GDP compared to the findings using surprises in 3-month federal funds
futures.
5.3 Transmission of monetary policy shocks
To study the transmission of monetary policy shocks I use large-scale Bayesian VAR fol-
lowing the work of Banbura et al. (2010), who introduced dummy variables prior similar to
Minnesota to work with a large number of variables in VAR. The model assumes natural
conjugate Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior for autoregression coefficients and variances. As
hyper-parameters I use λ 0.118, that controls overall prior tightness, and as the prior means
of coefficients I use ones for trending variables and zeros for stationary variables, prior mean
for a constant is 10019.
Figure 9 presents the results for a medium-scale VAR, that includes information vari-
ables, monetary policy shock variable, various interest rates and expectations from Consen-
18I tuned this hyper-parameter to match impulse responses of small scale VAR with Independent Normal-Inverse-
Wishart prior with Minnesota hyper-parameters, as shown in Appendix G
19These are the conventional settlings in literature
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sus Economics. Surprisingly, even without short-run restrictions slow-moving variables do
not respond much on impact, while fast-moving variables respond more sharply on impact.
The shock increases the costs of credit for about four months after the shock and reduces
S&P500 for about eight months after the shock. It leads to a steady decline in inflation and
a decline with reversion in real economic activity. The shock also leads to more negative
expectations of GDP and inflation. As a result, longer-term interest rates are not rising to
reflect these expectations. Moreover, it does not seem that a contractionary shock transmits
through term premium.
Figure 9: Monetary policy shock in medium-scale VAR
I use the big database of McCracken & Ng (2015), that contains 128 monthly variables.
This database includes variables that should capture variables from the central bank’s
reaction function. Moreover, there are forward-looking financial variables, which should
capture central banks’ and agents’ foresight. All variables were transformed into stationary
form, following the recommendations of McCracken & Ng (2015), and afterwards impulse
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responses were cumulated in levels.20 Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 report the results.
All slow-moving variables do not respond much on impact without any zero contempo-
raneous restrictions, while fast-moving variables do respond on impact. The shock leads to
an increase in all short-term interest rates up to one year rate.
The findings confirm the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission: indus-
trial production of durable consumer goods, business equipment and durable materials fall
more compared to other components of industrial production. Moreover, employment in
the durable sector falls at a higher rate than corresponding employment in the non-durable
sector. New orders for durable goods rise on impact after the shock, while at the same time
unfulfilled orders for durable goods increase for a few months after the shock. Inflation in
the durable sector does not decline in response to a shock, while the growth rate of personal
consumption expenditures on durables declines on impact.
In line with the results of Gertler & Karadi (2015), the credit channel21 is found to
be an important channel of monetary policy propagation. The shock rises on impact the
Excess Bond Premium, the three-month commercial paper spread, and leads to an increase
in the long-run spread between Moody’s BAA and the effective federal funds rate. The
Excess Bond Premium reflects long-run borrowing costs in the non-farm business sector,
the three-month commercial paper spread is relevant to the cost of short-term business
credit and the cost of financing consumer durables, and BAA spread measures credit risk.
The shock leads to a decrease in commercial loans on impact.
The balance sheet channel cannot be estimated directly. Nevertheless, the shock leads
with high probability to a reduction in house prices, since the largest share of posterior
probability mass lies in the negative region. That might be explained by the fact that
higher interest rates increase the costs of owning a house, which implies a lower asset value.
Therefore, a lower value of collateral leads to rising the borrowing cost, making it harder
for smaller or younger firms to get access to credit through asymmetric information among
economic agents.
As for the expectation channel of monetary policy, a contractionary monetary policy
shock also leads to a decline in consumer confidence in the long-run, measured by the
20With the exception of variables that were double differenced. Impulse responses for these variables are in growth
rates.
21Bernanke & Gertler (1995)
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consumer sentiment index. The shock also increases macroeconomic uncertainty, but the
effect is not persistent and disappears in about twelve months after the shock.
The asset price channel is also visible from impulse responses: S&P500 declined in the
long-run in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, as well as S&P industrial.
Lower asset prices together with lower in house prices, lead to a decline in consumption
and investment via wealth effect and the effect on the value of collateral. A decline in
manufacturing capacity utilisation could lead to subdued business investment in the fu-
ture. Moreover, there is a negative growth rate of personal consumption expenditures on
nondurable goods in about four months after the shock.
U.S. dollar appreciates on impact based on the response of trade-weighted U.S. dollar
index, that is compared to weighed shares of Euro, Japanese yen, Canadian dollar, British
pound, Swedish krona, and Swiss franc. That confirms the importance of the exchange rate
channel of monetary policy.
According to the results, all components of industrial production steadily decline in
response to a contractionary shock. Capacity utilisation in manufacturing also steadily
falls meaning that actual output in manufacturing slowly falls with respect to its potential
level.
Unemployment starts to increase in about eight months after the shock together with
average unemployment duration. The impact on unemployment is not distinguishable over
the short-term, possibly due to nominal rigidities in the economy. This effect mainly leads
to a larger share of long-term unemployed people. Average weekly hours worked also start
to decline in about eight months after the shock but the effect is less persistent here. Initial
claims increase in about four months after the shock and the effect is persistent for about
four years. These claims are filed by an unemployed individual after a separation from an
employer for eligibility for the Unemployment Insurance program.
A monetary contraction causes all components of growth rates of inflation to decline in
the short-run with exception of apparel, medical care and durables. These components are
less sensitive to a monetary policy shock.
Total business inventories start to decline steadily a few months after the shock, but
sales decline at a higher rate and therefore total business inventory to sales ratio increases
from the fourth to the twelfth months after the shock.
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Figure 10: Monetary policy shock in large-scale VAR
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Figure 12: Monetary policy shock in large-scale VAR
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6 Conclusions
The paper elaborates on the recent contribution of Jarocinski & Karadi (2020) in decom-
posing information from policy shocks, as well as on invertibility problem when econome-
trician’s information set differs from decision maker’s. This study uses information from
FOMC statements and augments the standard VAR with important information. This
allows to condition on information that is directly available to the public in real-time.
The study combines topic time series from FOMC statements with the tone of these
statements. I extract information from FOMC statements by using Latent Dirichlet Al-
location that was pre-trained on the business section from major U.S. newspapers. The
tone was assigned using a lexicon-based approach that counts positive and negative words
in each sentence. After topics time series were adjusted for the tone, these series were
investigated by their predictive power for surprises in 3-month federal funds futures on the
FOMC meeting dates. The topics, that were found to be important for these surprises, are
about the economy, credit, investment, company news and deals.
I use information released by the Fed in its’ statements as additional variables in VAR
that might affect policy surprises contemporaneously. The results show that a policy shock
has a more negative effect on GDP, a more prolonged negative effect on inflation and
greater effect on the excess bond premium compared to the baseline surprises measure.
In the short-run it causes S&P500 to decline and the Fed to raise its interest rate. The
transmission channels of monetary policy identified in this paper are in line with the theory:
monetary policy operates through the interest rate, credit, asset prices, exchange rate and
expectations channels. What is more, I did not find evidence of the importance of the term
premium channel for monetary policy transmission.
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Appendix A. Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Figure A.1: Coherence values for the number of topics
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Table A.1: Topic labelling for the LDA model
Topic Words
rates percent, year, increas, rate, averag, price, declin, rise, month, drop
computers comput, technolog, compani, system, softwar, product, appl, microsoft, electron, market
economic year, economi, growth, market, recess, expect, econom, mani, continu, industri
food food, year, product, price, farm, market, farmer, restaur, agricultur, produc
people peopl, time, make, thing, day, good, lot, work, back, tri
media advertis, onlin, ad, site, internet, web, time, media, googl, publish
fed rate, fed, interest, inflat, feder, reserv, economi, econom, polici, economist
housing home, hous, california, lo, angel, year, price, counti, sale, san
credit credit, consum, card, pay, custom, fee, account, servic, charg, check
cars car, sale, auto, vehicl, ford, year, motor, chrysler, truck, model
health insur, health, drug, care, compani, cost, medic, hospit, plan, year
trade trade, state, unit, american, countri, foreign, import, world, mexico, export
law case, court, investig, file, law, feder, charg, lawyer, attorney, judg
debt debt, financi, billion, govern, bankruptci, crisi, plan, financ, money, problem
loans bank, loan, mortgag, financi, feder, save, institut, borrow, lender, lend
stocks stock, market, index, point, dow, rose, fell, gain, close, share
schools chicago, school, photo, student, illinoi, famili, univers, colleg, program, tribun
economics studi, econom, research, chang, univers, professor, differ, mani, exampl, problem
retailers store, retail, sale, shop, year, chain, custom, buy, consum, holiday
industry compani, industri, product, manufactur, steel, million, busi, produc, equip, oper
cities citi, build, develop, offic, area, project, project, real, properti, million
profits million, quarter, share, billion, earn, year, profit, compani, cent, sale
jobs job, worker, work, employ, labor, employe, union, wage, unemploy, peopl
currency dollar, york, cent, price, gold, trade, late, exchang, futur, currenc
airlines airlin, travel, unit, air, fare, american, flight, carrier, boe, airport
military war, govern, nation, countri, offici, attack, militari, soviet, world, defens
energy power, energi, electr, state, util, plant, ga, water, cost, project
oil/gas price, oil, energi, barrel, ga, product, gasolin, crude, day, produc
international global, european, world, unit, europ, china, countri, british, intern, bank
hotels hotel, photo, room, year, park, show, game, open, peopl, time
rules propos, rule, regul, agenc, offici, feder, requir, law, member, committe
stock market trade, market, stock, exchang, firm, secur, street, wall, futur, option
company news compani, busi, execut, chief, firm, manag, presid, corpor, offic, year
services servic, compani, commun, phone, network, custom, provid, busi, cabl, telephon
investing fund, invest, stock, investor, market, manag, money, return, year, valu
president presid, hous, republican, democrat, obama, trump, senat, white, polit, administr
reports report, month, consum, economist, depart, increas, rose, declin, good, show
securities bond, rate, treasuri, market, yield, price, issu, interest, note, secur
budget tax, incom, year, budget, cut, plan, spend, save, pay, benefit
deals compani, share, deal, million, offer, stock, billion, sharehold, merger, bid
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Appendix B. Tone adjustment for topic time series
For assigning a sentiment for each sentence from FOMC statements I use a negation rule.
If the following words precede a collocation in the three-word window, then they are la-
belled as an opposite sentiment. Negation dictionary consists of the following words: aint,
arent, cannot, cant, couldnt, darent, didnt, doesnt, ain’t, aren’t, can’t, couldn’t, daren’t,
didn’t, doesn’t, dont, hadnt, hasnt, havent, isnt, mightnt, mustnt, neither, don’t, hadn’t,
hasn’t, haven’t, isn’t, mightn’t, mustn’t, neednt, needn’t, never, none, nope, nor, not, noth-
ing, nowhere, oughtnt, shant, shouldnt, wasnt, werent, oughtn’t, shan’t, shouldn’t, wasn’t,
weren’t, without, wont, wouldnt, won’t, wouldn’t, rarely, seldom, despite, no, nobody.
I assign tone for each sentence based on three different strategies:
1. Positivity is calculated for each sentence and it scales its topic frequencies which are
higher than the threshold (0.3).
2. Sign (positive/negative) is calculated for each sentence and it scales its topic frequen-
cies which are higher than the threshold (0.3).
3. Uncertainty is calculated for each sentence and it scales its topic frequencies which
are higher than the threshold (0.3).
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Appendix C. LDA and Fed Statements
C.1 Performance of LDA by paragraphs
1. The federal reserve board today approved an increase in the discount rate from 4 3/4
percent to 5 1/4 percent, effective immediately. 1995-02-01
Figure C.1: Topic proportions for the paragraph 1
2. The committee perceives the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustain-
able growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. the probability of an unwelcome
fall in inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of
a rise in inflation. with inflation quite low and resource use slack, the committee believes
that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation. 2004-03-16
Figure C.2: Topic proportions for the paragraph 2
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3. Developments in financial markets since the committee’s last regular meeting have
increased the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook. the committee will continue
to assess the effects of these and other developments on economic prospects and will act as
needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. 2007-09-18
Figure C.3: Topic proportions for the paragraph 3
4. Strains in financial markets have increased significantly and labor markets have
weakened further. economic growth appears to have slowed recently, partly reflecting a
softening of household spending. tight credit conditions, the ongoing housing contraction,
and some slowing in export growth are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next
few quarters. over time, the substantial easing of monetary policy, combined with ongoing
measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate economic growth.
2008-09-16
Figure C.4: Topic proportions for the paragraph 4
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5. Inflation has been high, spurred by the earlier increases in the prices of energy and
some other commodities. the committee expects inflation to moderate later this year and
next year, but the inflation outlook remains highly uncertain. 2008-09-16
Figure C.5: Topic proportions for the paragraph 5
6. The downside risks to growth and the upside risks to inflation are both of significant
concern to the committee. the committee will monitor economic and financial developments
carefully and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.
2008-09-16
Figure C.6: Topic proportions for the paragraph 6
7. Throughout the current financial crisis, central banks have engaged in continuous
close consultation and have cooperated in unprecedented joint actions such as the provision
of liquidity to reduce strains in financial markets. 2008-10-08
Nataliia Ostapenko 7
Figure C.7: Topic proportions for the paragraph 7
8. Information received since the federal open market committee met in june indicates
that the labor market strengthened and that economic activity has been expanding at a
moderate rate. job gains were strong in june following weak growth in may. on balance,
payrolls and other labor market indicators point to some increase in labor utilization in
recent months. household spending has been growing strongly but business fixed investment
has been soft. inflation has continued to run below the committee’s 2 percent longer-run
objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy
imports. market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; most survey-based
measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent
months. 2016-07-27
Figure C.8: Topic proportions for the paragraph 8
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9. The coronavirus outbreak is causing tremendous human and economic hardship
across the united states and around the world. the virus and the measures taken to protect
public health are inducing sharp declines in economic activity and a surge in job losses.
weaker demand and significantly lower oil prices are holding down consumer price inflation.
the disruptions to economic activity here and abroad have significantly affected financial
conditions and have impaired the flow of credit to u.s. households and businesses. 2020-
04-29
Figure C.9: Topic proportions for the paragraph 9
C.2 Performance of LDA by sentences
1. Job gains have been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate
has remained low. 2018-12-19
Figure C.10: Topic proportions for the sentence 1
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2. Household spending has continued to grow strongly, while growth of business fixed
investment has moderated from its rapid pace earlier in the year. 2018-12-19
Figure C.11: Topic proportions for the sentence 2
3. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for items other than food
and energy remain near 2 percent. 2018-12-19
Figure C.12: Topic proportions for the sentence 3
4. Indicators of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance. 2018-
12-19
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Figure C.13: Topic proportions for the sentence 4
5. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the committee seeks to foster maximum
employment and price stability. 2018-12-19
Figure C.14: Topic proportions for the sentence 5
6. The committee judges that some further gradual increases in the target range for the
federal funds rate will be consistent with sustained expansion of economic activity, strong
labor market conditions, and inflation near the committee’s symmetric 2 percent objective
over the medium term. 2018-12-19
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Figure C.15: Topic proportions for the sentence 6
7. The committee judges that risks to the economic outlook are roughly balanced,
but will continue to monitor global economic and financial developments and assess their
implications for the economic outlook. 2018-12-19
Figure C.16: Topic proportions for the sentence 7
8. In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the committee
decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. 2018-
12-19
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Figure C.17: Topic proportions for the sentence 8
9. In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the
federal funds rate, the committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions rel-
ative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective.
2018-12-19
Figure C.18: Topic proportions for the sentence 9
C.3 Classifying QE sentences
1. As previously announced, over the next few quarters the federal reserve will purchase
large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the
mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt
and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. 2008-12-16
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Figure C.19: Topic proportions for the sentence 1
2. The committee also is prepared to purchase longer-term treasury securities if evolving
circumstances indicate that such transactions would be particularly effective in improving
conditions in private credit markets. 2009-01-28
Figure C.20: Topic proportions for the sentence 2
3. To provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the committee
decided today to increase the size of the federal reserve?s balance sheet further by purchasing
up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total
purchases of these securities to up to. 2009-03-18
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Figure C.21: Topic proportions for the sentence 3
4. 125 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to
$100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion
Figure C.22: Topic proportions for the sentence 4
5. in addition, the committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term
treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per
month. 2010-11-03
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Figure C.23: Topic proportions for the sentence 5
6. The committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial
developments in coming months and will continue its purchases of treasury and agency
mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the
outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability.
2014-09-17
Figure C.24: Topic proportions for the sentence 6
7. In addition, the federal reserve will conduct term and overnight repurchase agreement
operations at least through january of next year to ensure that the supply of reserves remains
ample even during periods of sharp increases in non-reserve liabilities, and to mitigate the
risk of money market pressures that could adversely affect policy implementation. 2019-
10-11
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Figure C.25: Topic proportions for the sentence 7
C.4 Classifying Forward Guidance sentences
1. the committee anticipates, based on its current assessment, that it likely will be ap-
propriate to maintain the 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate for a
considerable time following the end of its asset purchase program this month, especially if
projected inflation continues to run below the committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and
provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. 2014-10-29
Figure C.26: Topic proportions for the sentence 1
2. The committee sees this guidance as consistent with its previous statement that
it likely will be appropriate to maintain the 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal
funds rate for a considerable time following the end of its asset purchase program in october,
Nataliia Ostapenko 17
especially if projected inflation continues to run below the committee’s 2 percent longer-run
goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. 2014-12-17
Figure C.27: Topic proportions for the sentence 2
3. The committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that
it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate
well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially
if projected inflation continues to run below the committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal.
2014-01-29
Figure C.28: Topic proportions for the sentence 3
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Figure C.29: Aggregated topic proportions by sentence
Figure C.30: Aggregated topic proportions by paragraph
Figure C.31: Aggregated topic proportions by sentence with sign adjustment
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Appendix D. Information in FOMC statements
Figure D.1: Economic topic
Figure D.2: Economic topic from combination of dictionaries without directional words
Figure D.3: Economic topic from combination of dictionaries with directional words
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Figure D.4: Fed topic
Figure D.5: Fed topic from combination of dictionaries without directional words
Figure D.6: Fed topic from combination of dictionaries with directional words
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21Figure D.7: Topic frequencies over time
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Figure D.9: Topic time series uncertainty tone adjusted
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Appendix E. Model selection
(a) Sign adjustment
(b) Non-adjusted frequency
(c) Uncertainty
(d) Positive tone for shocks from Gertler & Karadi (2015)
Figure E.1: Posterior inclusion probabilities
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Figure E.2: Bayesian Lasso for surprises in 3m federal funds futures
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Figure E.5: Bayesian Lasso for surprises in S&P with asymmetric effect
N
a
t
a
l
iia
O
s
t
a
p
e
n
k
o
29
Table E.1: Predictability of topic time series
Dependent variable:
rates computers economic food people media fed housing credit cars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ NEER USA −0.015 0.007 −0.003 −0.0002 −0.036∗ 0.006 −0.005 0.025 0.018 0.010
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007)
∆ NEER Euro 0.020∗ −0.012 0.013 0.002 0.037∗∗ −0.005 0.030∗ −0.022 −0.019∗ −0.010
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007)
∆ TEDRATE −0.099 0.227 0.675∗∗ −0.023 −0.373 0.119 −0.029 0.723∗∗∗ 0.190 0.168
(0.179) (0.260) (0.286) (0.080) (0.260) (0.150) (0.307) (0.154) (0.255) (0.105)
∆ S&P500 −0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003 −0.00002 0.0003 0.0001 −0.001∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
∆ AAA10Y −0.004 −0.707 0.228 0.164 −0.055 0.538 −1.804∗∗ −0.129 0.675 0.426
(0.473) (0.726) (0.498) (0.251) (0.707) (0.558) (0.812) (0.413) (0.532) (0.587)
∆ BAA10Y 0.132 0.371 −0.797∗ −0.127 0.067 −0.481 0.758 −0.607∗ −0.514 −0.404
(0.346) (0.457) (0.413) (0.256) (0.542) (0.593) (0.700) (0.313) (0.612) (0.518)
Constant 0.004 −0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.001 0.009 −0.001 0.002 −0.001
(0.086) (0.076) (0.090) (0.094) (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.035) (0.082) (0.073)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195
R2 0.016 0.019 0.063 0.001 0.070 0.008 0.113 0.068 0.024 0.011
Adjusted R2 -0.016 -0.012 0.033 -0.031 0.041 -0.024 0.085 0.038 -0.007 -0.020
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.2: Predictability of topic time series
Dependent variable:
health trade law debt loans stocks schools economics retailers industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ NEER USA 0.005 −0.015 −0.010 0.011 −0.003 0.007 0.008 −0.007 −0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
∆ NEER Euro −0.011 0.019 0.011 0.007 0.020 −0.001 −0.005 0.011 0.012 −0.005
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
∆ TEDRATE 0.388 0.240 −0.189∗ 0.038 −0.044 0.148 −0.161 −0.152 0.076 0.843∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.348) (0.108) (0.431) (0.260) (0.343) (0.167) (0.324) (0.131) (0.319)
∆ S&P500 −0.001 0.001 −0.00003 0.0005 −0.0003 0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗ 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆ AAA10Y −0.555 0.078 −0.008 −0.099 0.527 0.326 −0.060 −0.454 0.713 −0.079
(0.574) (0.640) (0.481) (0.705) (0.649) (0.467) (0.418) (0.430) (0.672) (0.768)
∆ BAA10Y 0.731 −0.288 0.148 −0.922 −0.796 −0.732∗∗ −0.149 −0.128 −0.819 −0.212
(0.581) (0.393) (0.327) (0.643) (0.565) (0.366) (0.369) (0.292) (0.709) (0.513)
Constant 0.002 −0.005 0.0001 0.001 0.008 −0.002 −0.0001 −0.007 0.003 −0.003
(0.079) (0.087) (0.097) (0.070) (0.097) (0.084) (0.073) (0.075) (0.072) (0.088)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195
R2 0.054 0.049 0.007 0.094 0.045 0.031 0.009 0.053 0.023 0.056
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.019 -0.025 0.065 0.015 -0.0001 -0.022 0.023 -0.008 0.026
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.3: Predictability of topic time series
Dependent variable:
cities profits jobs currency airlines military energy oil/gas international hotels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ NEER USA 0.003 0.005 0.004 −0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.007 −0.008 −0.012 0.025
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017)
∆ NEER Euro −0.001 0.00001 0.005 −0.005 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.023∗∗ −0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
∆ TEDRATE −0.156 0.261 0.334 0.036 −0.183 −0.048 −0.274∗∗ 0.266 −0.480 −0.010
(0.183) (0.185) (0.203) (0.509) (0.173) (0.164) (0.136) (0.305) (0.444) (0.139)
∆ S&P500 0.0001 0.0003 0.00001 0.00000 −0.00003 0.001∗ 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
∆ AAA10Y −0.709 −0.136 1.044∗∗ 0.048 −1.023 −0.961∗ −0.349 −0.936∗ −0.663 0.863
(0.451) (0.499) (0.500) (0.740) (0.886) (0.512) (0.399) (0.562) (0.529) (0.676)
∆ BAA10Y 0.348 −0.368 −1.159∗∗∗ 0.150 0.430 0.246 0.279 0.288 0.055 −0.993
(0.361) (0.315) (0.418) (0.886) (0.330) (0.286) (0.343) (0.468) (0.293) (0.710)
Constant −0.001 −0.001 0.004 −0.001 0.001 −0.010 −0.008 −0.002 −0.003 0.003
(0.076) (0.086) (0.085) (0.093) (0.070) (0.071) (0.086) (0.087) (0.081) (0.069)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195
R2 0.011 0.019 0.044 0.005 0.030 0.061 0.040 0.034 0.068 0.057
Adjusted R2 -0.021 -0.012 0.013 -0.027 -0.001 0.031 0.009 0.003 0.038 0.027
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
B
a
n
k
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
t
io
n
:
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
io
n
a
n
d
P
o
l
ic
y
s
h
o
c
k
s
32
Table E.4: Predictability of topic time series
Dependent variable:
rules stock market company news services investing president reports securities budget deals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆ NEER USA −0.005 0.001 −0.022∗∗ 0.00002 0.005 0.012 0.001 0.001 −0.005 −0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
∆ NEER Euro 0.024∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.032∗∗∗ −0.008 0.010 −0.018 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
∆ TEDRATE 0.171 0.238 0.003 −0.389 0.534∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗ −0.391 0.350∗ 0.138
(0.262) (0.253) (0.206) (0.269) (0.303) (0.229) (0.258) (0.329) (0.183) (0.205)
∆ S&P500 −0.001∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0002 0.002∗ 0.0001 −0.0002 0.0004∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
∆ AAA10Y −0.227 0.551 0.444 −0.056 −0.464 0.056 1.240∗∗ −1.215∗∗ 1.076∗ 1.586∗∗
(0.557) (0.700) (0.710) (0.654) (0.737) (0.415) (0.562) (0.529) (0.609) (0.739)
∆ BAA10Y −0.018 −1.147∗∗ −0.338 −0.299 −0.425 −0.116 −1.393∗∗∗ 0.509 −1.233∗∗ −0.976∗
(0.397) (0.574) (0.665) (0.416) (0.609) (0.379) (0.455) (0.434) (0.517) (0.588)
Constant 0.015 0.002 0.004 −0.019 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.0003 −0.002 0.005
(0.043) (0.082) (0.089) (0.069) (0.091) (0.095) (0.089) (0.055) (0.099) (0.083)
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195
R2 0.098 0.066 0.033 0.208 0.055 0.059 0.068 0.047 0.062 0.042
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.037 0.002 0.182 0.025 0.029 0.039 0.016 0.032 0.012
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix F. Effect of Central bank communication
F.1 Central bank communication and Yield curves
Table F.1: ∆Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated −0.114 0.741 1.672∗ 1.818∗∗ 1.720∗∗ 1.608∗∗ 1.486∗∗ 1.357∗∗
(0.810) (0.848) (0.930) (0.908) (0.795) (0.701) (0.666) (0.677)
Fed news −0.193 0.017 −0.172 −0.350 −0.319 −0.271 −0.250 −0.264
(0.910) (1.123) (1.146) (1.015) (0.896) (0.833) (0.781) (0.753)
Fed news on FG dates 0.312 −0.506 −1.214 −1.110 −0.806 −0.654 −0.655 −0.742
(0.805) (0.855) (0.981) (0.911) (0.820) (0.759) (0.742) (0.752)
Constant −0.003 −0.008 −0.013 −0.014 −0.013 −0.012 −0.011 −0.009
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
R2 0.001 0.006 0.023 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.027
Adjusted R2 -0.015 -0.011 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.011
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.2: ∆ Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 0.721 1.459 3.110∗ 3.739∗∗ 3.329∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 2.471∗∗∗ 2.231∗∗
(0.935) (1.226) (1.723) (1.830) (1.460) (1.086) (0.909) (0.936)
∆Fed news 0.496 0.530 −1.144 −1.767 −1.090 −0.600 −0.591 −0.927
(0.997) (1.320) (1.628) (1.420) (1.079) (0.921) (0.974) (1.075)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −0.066 −0.743 0.040 0.564 0.179 −0.080 0.135 0.739
(1.753) (2.161) (2.478) (2.145) (1.676) (1.509) (1.561) (1.636)
Constant −0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001 −0.0003 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R2 0.010 0.021 0.048 0.079 0.088 0.082 0.069 0.053
Adjusted R2 -0.006 0.004 0.032 0.064 0.073 0.067 0.053 0.038
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.3: ∆ Forward Rates, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 2.036∗∗ 2.290∗∗ 1.678∗∗ 1.396∗ 1.144 0.855 0.581 2.371∗∗
(1.034) (1.125) (0.852) (0.745) (0.717) (0.869) (1.223) (1.145)
Fed news 0.088 −0.556 −0.390 −0.163 −0.122 −0.237 −0.448 −0.501
(1.366) (1.242) (0.924) (0.915) (0.876) (1.050) (1.517) (1.306)
Fed news on FG dates −1.602 −1.559 −0.472 −0.079 −0.389 −0.924 −1.414 −1.660
(1.118) (1.099) (0.844) (0.785) (0.770) (0.918) (1.250) (1.136)
Constant −0.015 −0.016 −0.013 −0.011 −0.008 −0.003 0.002 −0.017
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
R2 0.028 0.030 0.023 0.021 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.031
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.014 0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.015
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.4: ∆ Forward Rates, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 2.855 4.940∗∗ 3.417∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ 1.089 0.988 1.075 4.913∗∗
(1.805) (2.421) (1.334) (0.671) (0.735) (0.982) (1.896) (2.467)
∆ Fed news −0.198 −3.323∗ −0.925 1.009 0.374 −1.582 −3.575∗ −3.252∗
(1.890) (1.835) (1.157) (1.683) (1.940) (1.785) (2.040) (1.862)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −0.973 1.427 0.272 −1.140 −0.196 2.355 5.110∗ 1.328
(2.836) (2.758) (1.519) (2.101) (2.490) (2.436) (2.735) (2.851)
Constant −0.001 −0.006 −0.001 0.004 0.002 −0.001 −0.005 −0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R2 0.035 0.082 0.087 0.045 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.075
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.067 0.071 0.029 -0.001 -0.006 0.0001 0.060
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.5: ∆ Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 0.171 1.476 3.046∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ 2.883∗∗ 2.414∗∗ 1.913∗∗ 1.385
(0.981) (0.950) (1.147) (1.231) (1.174) (1.064) (0.971) (0.949)
Fed news 0.377 1.107 1.722 2.349∗ 2.472∗ 2.167∗ 1.622 0.969
(1.116) (1.286) (1.427) (1.404) (1.298) (1.226) (1.200) (1.275)
Fed news on FG dates −0.109 −1.343 −2.293∗ −2.454∗∗ −2.277∗ −1.969∗ −1.589 −1.167
(0.824) (0.901) (1.186) (1.222) (1.173) (1.130) (1.110) (1.131)
Constant −0.020 −0.031∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.025
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
R2 0.001 0.027 0.066 0.075 0.074 0.063 0.043 0.020
Adjusted R2 -0.015 0.011 0.051 0.060 0.058 0.048 0.027 0.003
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.6: ∆ Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated −0.702 0.229 2.777 4.250∗ 3.962∗ 3.257∗ 2.566∗ 1.999∗
(0.991) (1.203) (2.032) (2.451) (2.164) (1.701) (1.322) (1.205)
∆ Fed news 1.676 2.413 1.442 1.029 1.716 2.001 1.561 0.634
(1.269) (1.472) (1.360) (1.761) (1.862) (1.879) (2.126) (2.480)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −2.183 −2.862 −2.039 −1.288 −1.621 −1.696 −1.005 0.279
(1.380) (1.806) (2.241) (2.621) (2.514) (2.461) (2.681) (3.124)
Constant −0.016∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.011 −0.012∗ −0.011 −0.009 −0.007 −0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R2 0.007 0.013 0.041 0.073 0.081 0.073 0.052 0.028
Adjusted R2 -0.009 -0.003 0.025 0.058 0.066 0.058 0.037 0.012
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.7: ∆ Forward Rates, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 3.432∗∗∗ 4.225∗∗∗ 2.720∗ 1.536 0.476 −0.673 −1.817 4.355∗∗∗
(1.298) (1.514) (1.398) (1.115) (1.125) (1.544) (2.144) (1.523)
Fed news 1.950 2.465 3.154∗∗ 2.092 0.359 −1.460 −3.089 2.371
(1.636) (1.754) (1.401) (1.305) (1.473) (2.177) (3.264) (1.805)
Fed news on FG dates −2.873∗∗ −2.857∗ −2.313∗ −1.506 −0.569 0.442 1.434 −2.945∗
(1.292) (1.524) (1.340) (1.218) (1.246) (1.563) (2.119) (1.548)
Constant −0.049∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.007 0.022 0.051 −0.074∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.048) (0.022)
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186
R2 0.072 0.071 0.060 0.032 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.073
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.056 0.044 0.016 -0.014 -0.011 -0.002 0.057
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.8: ∆ Forward Rates, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 2.151 5.946∗ 4.739∗∗ 2.117∗ 0.330 −0.616 −0.968 5.732∗
(1.919) (3.076) (2.350) (1.244) (1.355) (1.992) (2.697) (3.060)
∆ Fed news 2.603 −0.220 2.030 3.578 1.628 −2.128 −5.756 −0.059
(1.812) (2.085) (2.576) (2.748) (3.223) (4.198) (5.505) (1.973)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −3.058 −0.426 −1.362 −2.744 −0.491 4.205 9.105 −0.673
(2.575) (3.287) (3.021) (3.246) (4.041) (5.250) (6.789) (3.229)
Constant −0.005 −0.015 −0.011 −0.004 −0.001 0.001 0.003 −0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009)
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R2 0.031 0.077 0.086 0.054 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.072
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.062 0.071 0.038 -0.010 -0.009 0.0002 0.056
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.9: ∆ TIPS Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 2.526∗∗ 2.220∗ 2.011∗ 1.952∗∗ 2.568∗∗ 1.538 1.729∗ 1.678∗∗
(1.264) (1.163) (1.066) (0.958) (1.305) (1.142) (0.980) (0.841)
Fed news −1.006 −1.004 −0.922 −0.781 −1.116 −0.930 −0.525 −0.346
(1.688) (1.378) (1.204) (1.105) (1.465) (1.202) (1.094) (1.135)
Fed news on FG dates −1.879∗ −1.208 −1.014 −1.027 −1.318 −0.323 −0.951 −0.998
(1.139) (1.027) (0.930) (0.853) (1.124) (1.012) (0.895) (0.804)
Constant −0.008 −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.012 −0.010 −0.014 −0.011
(0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.041 0.034 0.036 0.045 0.036 0.017 0.040 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.011 0.014 0.022 0.013 -0.006 0.018 0.024
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.10: ∆ TIPS Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 4.813∗∗ 4.587∗∗ 4.324∗∗ 3.982∗∗ 4.856∗ 4.013∗ 3.530∗∗∗ 2.155∗∗∗
(2.372) (2.263) (2.067) (1.749) (2.588) (2.066) (1.280) (0.810)
∆ Fed news −3.915 −3.428 −2.579 −1.709 −4.251∗ −1.830 0.086 1.519
(2.579) (2.243) (1.735) (1.239) (2.534) (1.607) (0.889) (1.769)
∆ Fed news on FG dates 1.206 1.549 0.909 0.009 2.361 0.959 −1.713 −3.351
(3.510) (2.971) (2.342) (1.810) (3.243) (2.228) (1.356) (2.126)
Constant −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 −0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.082 0.099 0.123 0.140 0.092 0.113 0.150 0.102
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.078 0.102 0.120 0.071 0.092 0.130 0.081
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.11: ∆ Inflation Compensation, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic aggregated −0.279 −0.504 −0.311 −0.488 −0.728∗
(0.727) (0.434) (0.374) (0.363) (0.387)
Fed news −0.832 0.304 0.189 0.004 −0.158
(1.177) (0.593) (0.446) (0.451) (0.490)
Fed news on FG dates 0.617 0.252 −0.265 −0.004 0.286
(0.611) (0.435) (0.354) (0.332) (0.355)
Constant 0.018 0.006 0.008 0.013∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.020
Adjusted R2 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 -0.003
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.12: ∆ Inflation Compensation, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Economic aggregated −2.301∗ −0.945 −0.158 −0.520 −0.814
(1.174) (0.633) (0.411) (0.531) (0.650)
∆Fed news 2.170 2.495∗∗ 1.301 1.243 0.974
(1.886) (1.185) (0.823) (0.858) (1.018)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −0.782 −1.197 −0.860 −0.598 0.001
(2.526) (1.472) (1.040) (1.106) (1.336)
Constant 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.040 0.051 0.019 0.020 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.029 -0.004 -0.003 0.002
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.13: ∆ TIPS Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 3.517∗∗ 3.159∗∗ 2.611∗∗ 2.504∗∗ 4.096∗∗ 1.771 1.608∗ 2.909∗∗
(1.443) (1.394) (1.195) (1.069) (1.794) (1.224) (0.945) (1.195)
Fed news 2.244 2.010 1.967 2.134 2.065 1.546 2.366 2.528∗
(2.323) (1.909) (1.656) (1.539) (2.051) (1.584) (1.508) (1.355)
Fed news on FG dates −2.459∗ −1.926 −1.523 −1.555 −2.352 −0.730 −0.974 −2.493∗∗
(1.351) (1.289) (1.190) (1.143) (1.518) (1.284) (1.186) (1.214)
Constant −0.072∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.062∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.061 0.057 0.027 0.051 0.094
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.039 0.035 0.004 0.029 0.073
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.14: ∆ TIPS Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 5.579∗∗ 5.433∗∗ 4.605∗ 4.271∗∗ 6.660∗∗ 3.719 2.710∗∗∗ 4.068∗∗∗
(2.828) (2.645) (2.472) (2.071) (3.130) (2.337) (0.921) (1.395)
∆Fed news −2.209 −2.501 −1.673 −0.576 −4.136 −1.497 1.507 3.505∗
(3.118) (2.732) (2.082) (1.513) (3.458) (1.967) (1.606) (2.012)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −1.269 −0.034 −0.133 −0.878 1.448 0.687 −1.583 −4.662∗
(4.067) (3.537) (2.722) (2.142) (4.231) (2.656) (2.246) (2.405)
Constant −0.018 −0.015 −0.015∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.013 −0.013 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.013∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.068 0.082 0.082 0.093 0.088 0.055 0.069 0.153
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.060 0.060 0.072 0.067 0.033 0.047 0.133
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.15: ∆ Inflation Compensation, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic aggregated −0.446 −0.281 0.165 0.031 −0.519
(0.962) (0.704) (0.678) (0.721) (0.704)
Fed news −1.766 0.394 1.177 1.082 0.551
(2.603) (1.406) (0.827) (0.827) (0.907)
Fed news on FG dates 0.136 −0.327 −0.857 −0.933 −0.463
(0.975) (0.751) (0.646) (0.650) (0.685)
Constant 0.041 0.012 −0.005 0.001 0.012
(0.046) (0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.005
Adjusted R2 -0.016 -0.022 -0.012 -0.011 -0.018
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.16: ∆ Inflation Compensation, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Economic aggregated −3.740∗∗ −2.018 −0.351 0.034 −0.500
(1.862) (1.344) (0.773) (0.742) (0.876)
∆ Fed news −0.0005 2.973 2.132 2.058 1.544
(3.716) (2.627) (1.956) (1.720) (1.978)
∆ Fed news on FG dates 2.071 −0.784 −0.677 −0.806 −0.316
(4.367) (3.117) (2.364) (2.097) (2.454)
Constant 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.009∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132
R2 0.039 0.030 0.021 0.025 0.012
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.011
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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F.2 Central bank communication and MP shocks
Table F.17: ∆ Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 1.401 2.373 4.138∗ 4.627∗ 3.902∗∗ 3.128∗∗ 2.554∗∗ 2.166∗
(0.939) (1.458) (2.463) (2.583) (1.961) (1.415) (1.168) (1.168)
∆ Fed news 1.013 1.121 −0.751 −1.739 −0.935 −0.242 −0.113 −0.409
(1.672) (2.018) (2.485) (2.390) (1.704) (1.295) (1.326) (1.529)
∆Fed news on FG dates −1.360 −2.571 −1.906 −0.596 −0.774 −1.134 −0.936 −0.162
(1.638) (2.110) (2.790) (2.721) (1.956) (1.565) (1.689) (2.045)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.478∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.075 0.042 0.015
(0.105) (0.117) (0.111) (0.086) (0.076) (0.069) (0.062) (0.059)
Constant −0.009∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.008 −0.006 −0.003 −0.001 0.0002 0.0003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.382 0.308 0.180 0.131 0.115 0.095 0.071 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.289 0.158 0.108 0.091 0.070 0.046 0.023
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.18: ∆ Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 0.055 1.281 4.255∗ 5.706∗ 5.006∗∗ 3.912∗∗ 2.919∗∗ 2.082
(0.972) (1.399) (2.395) (2.946) (2.532) (1.924) (1.469) (1.457)
∆ Fed news 1.570 2.348 1.146 0.502 1.482 2.038 1.658 0.609
(1.308) (1.743) (2.200) (2.586) (2.641) (2.648) (2.815) (3.002)
∆Fed news on FG dates −2.476∗ −3.875∗∗ −3.073 −1.560 −1.762 −1.911 −1.084 0.650
(1.372) (1.827) (2.735) (3.172) (3.024) (3.146) (3.650) (4.011)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.607∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.219 0.158 0.102 0.042
(0.083) (0.116) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.135) (0.117) (0.121)
Constant −0.016∗∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.013 −0.014 −0.012 −0.009 −0.006 −0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.420 0.299 0.170 0.129 0.115 0.095 0.062 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.405 0.281 0.148 0.105 0.091 0.071 0.037 0.003
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.19: ∆ Forward Rates, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 4.044 5.984∗ 3.753∗∗ 1.392 0.402 0.208 0.233 5.997∗
(2.477) (3.421) (1.730) (0.937) (0.979) (1.188) (2.245) (3.491)
∆ Fed news 0.458 −3.538 −0.991 1.814 1.406 −0.738 −2.960 −3.313
(2.678) (3.090) (1.733) (2.060) (2.404) (2.208) (3.142) (3.162)
∆Fed news on FG dates −3.462 0.155 0.197 −2.210 −1.633 1.663 5.747 −0.259
(3.056) (3.738) (2.015) (2.535) (2.968) (3.006) (4.281) (3.800)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.454∗∗∗ 0.163∗ −0.022 −0.064 −0.082 −0.105 −0.136 0.206∗∗
(0.140) (0.084) (0.068) (0.070) (0.068) (0.077) (0.092) (0.093)
Constant −0.006 −0.009 −0.0005 0.006 0.006 0.003 −0.001 −0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.188 0.103 0.089 0.050 0.023 0.016 0.027 0.105
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.079 0.065 0.024 -0.003 -0.010 0.001 0.081
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.20: ∆ Forward Rates, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year 1 Year Forward 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic aggregated 3.677 7.807∗∗ 5.547∗ 1.866 −0.374 −1.639 −2.518 7.624∗∗
(2.328) (3.751) (2.903) (1.552) (1.795) (2.891) (3.793) (3.671)
Fed news 2.550 −1.084 1.776 4.380 2.342 −2.250 −6.896 −0.812
(2.739) (3.106) (3.573) (3.441) (4.022) (4.849) (6.737) (3.015)
Fed news on FG dates −4.832 −0.629 −0.756 −3.098 −0.735 5.593 13.036 −1.162
(3.139) (4.175) (3.913) (4.025) (5.146) (6.480) (8.800) (4.106)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.513∗∗∗ 0.280∗ 0.068 0.009 −0.065 −0.187 −0.339 0.325∗
(0.181) (0.161) (0.167) (0.142) (0.126) (0.250) (0.424) (0.169)
Constant −0.007 −0.017 −0.011 −0.003 0.003 0.007 0.012 −0.017
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.162 0.113 0.095 0.055 0.008 0.021 0.042 0.116
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.089 0.071 0.030 -0.018 -0.005 0.017 0.092
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.21: ∆ TIPS Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Economic aggregated 7.996∗∗ 7.076∗∗ 6.214∗∗ 5.435∗∗ 7.476∗∗ 5.147∗ 3.869∗∗ 2.173∗∗
(3.289) (3.223) (2.759) (2.250) (3.622) (2.664) (1.617) (1.071)
∆Fed news −5.656 −4.372 −3.051 −1.752 −5.029 −1.652 0.906 3.216
(4.840) (3.760) (3.119) (2.608) (3.896) (2.896) (2.160) (3.292)
∆ Fed news on FG dates −0.274 0.004 −0.416 −1.370 0.397 −0.084 −2.727 −5.562
(5.324) (4.126) (3.463) (2.981) (4.289) (3.200) (2.624) (3.625)
PCA ffr4 hf −0.041 −0.092 −0.100 −0.100 −0.129 −0.137 −0.103 −0.098
(0.330) (0.289) (0.251) (0.220) (0.330) (0.220) (0.160) (0.126)
Constant −0.006 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.0001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.149 0.161 0.169 0.174 0.148 0.134 0.138 0.107
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.127 0.136 0.140 0.114 0.099 0.103 0.071
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.22: ∆ TIPS Yields, two days difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EC 7.996∗∗ 7.076∗∗ 6.214∗∗ 5.435∗∗ 7.476∗∗ 5.147∗ 3.869∗∗ 2.173∗∗
(3.289) (3.223) (2.759) (2.250) (3.622) (2.664) (1.617) (1.071)
X7 −5.656 −4.372 −3.051 −1.752 −5.029 −1.652 0.906 3.216
(4.840) (3.760) (3.119) (2.608) (3.896) (2.896) (2.160) (3.292)
FG −0.274 0.004 −0.416 −1.370 0.397 −0.084 −2.727 −5.562
(5.324) (4.126) (3.463) (2.981) (4.289) (3.200) (2.624) (3.625)
pc1ff1 hf −0.041 −0.092 −0.100 −0.100 −0.129 −0.137 −0.103 −0.098
(0.330) (0.289) (0.251) (0.220) (0.330) (0.220) (0.160) (0.126)
Constant −0.006 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.0001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.149 0.161 0.169 0.174 0.148 0.134 0.138 0.107
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.127 0.136 0.140 0.114 0.099 0.103 0.071
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.23: ∆ Inflation Compensation, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Economic aggregated −4.198∗∗ −2.277∗∗ −0.871∗ −1.020 −1.303
(1.740) (0.985) (0.501) (0.749) (0.924)
∆Fed news 6.007∗ 5.345∗∗ 2.942∗∗ 2.526∗ 2.174
(3.073) (2.329) (1.190) (1.293) (1.600)
∆ Fed news on FG date −1.977 −2.509 −1.736 −1.446 −0.839
(2.911) (2.047) (1.359) (1.525) (1.900)
PCA ffr4 hf −0.011 0.041 0.031 0.046 0.104
(0.116) (0.096) (0.060) (0.064) (0.076)
Constant 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.127 0.153 0.062 0.052 0.071
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.119 0.024 0.014 0.033
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.24: ∆ Inflation Compensation, two days difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Economic aggregated −4.198∗∗ −2.277∗∗ −0.871∗ −1.020 −1.303
(1.740) (0.985) (0.501) (0.749) (0.924)
∆Fed news 6.007∗ 5.345∗∗ 2.942∗∗ 2.526∗ 2.174
(3.073) (2.329) (1.190) (1.293) (1.600)
∆Fed news on FG dates −1.977 −2.509 −1.736 −1.446 −0.839
(2.911) (2.047) (1.359) (1.525) (1.900)
PCA ffr4 hf −0.011 0.041 0.031 0.046 0.104
(0.116) (0.096) (0.060) (0.064) (0.076)
Constant 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.127 0.153 0.062 0.052 0.071
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.119 0.024 0.014 0.033
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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F.3 On measurement error and bad controls
Table F.25: ∆ Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 25 Year 30 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.461∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.090 0.045 0.017 −0.005
(0.099) (0.109) (0.105) (0.085) (0.075) (0.068) (0.061) (0.057)
Constant −0.009∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.007 −0.006 −0.003 −0.0002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
R2 0.350 0.254 0.101 0.030 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.00005
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.249 0.095 0.024 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.26: ∆ TIPS Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year 5 Year F 10 Year F 15 Year F 20 Year F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PCA ffr4 hf −0.085 −0.127 −0.133 −0.135 −0.163 −0.159 −0.138 −0.146
(0.349) (0.305) (0.264) (0.231) (0.344) (0.228) (0.170) (0.135)
Constant −0.005 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.014 0.016 0.020
Adjusted R2 -0.008 -0.003 0.0001 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.006 0.010
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.27: ∆ Inflation Compensation, one day difference
Dependent variable:
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.001 0.039 0.025 0.043 0.106
(0.130) (0.106) (0.065) (0.065) (0.074)
Constant 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.00000 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.030
Adjusted R2 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 0.020
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table F.28: ∆ Yields, one day difference
Dependent variable:
1 Year high frequency surprises
(1) (2)
PCA ffr4 hf 0.481∗∗∗
(0.137)
PCA S&P500 hf 0.002
(0.011)
ff4 hf −0.021
(0.268)
Economic aggregated −1.655
(1.485)
Fed news on FG dates 1.154
(2.720)
Fed news −0.085
(2.877)
Constant −0.009∗∗ 0.002
(0.005) (0.007)
Observations 155 155
R2 0.350 0.017
Adjusted R2 0.337 -0.003
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix G. The Bayesian Vector Autoregression
I use Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) with an independent normal-invertedWishart
prior for the reduced form coefficients (see Koop & Korobilis (2010) for more details):
p(β,Q) = p(β)p(Q)
p(β) ∼ fN (β|β, Vβ)
p(Q) ∼ fIW (Q|Q, vQ)
For dealing with overfitting I entertain a prior in Minnesota fashion. Prior for βm (3-month
federal funds futures and S&P 500 surprises) is set to 0, other β at 1 for its own lags, and
zero everywhere else. Vβ is a diagonal matrix implying that the standard deviation of lag l
of variable j in equation i is
λ1λ2σi
σjlλ3
for j 6= i,
λ1
lλ3
for j = i and λ4σi for a constant. I use
standard hyperparameters from the literature: λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.5, λ3 = 1, λ4 = 100. σi, σj
are scaled measures of the variance associated with the AR(p) equation estimate. Q is a
diagonal matrix. Lastly, I set vQ = 10. Based on the priors the conditional posterior for β
is:
β|y,Q−1 ∼ N(β, Vb)Is(β)
Vβ = (Vβ
−1 +
T∑
t=1
X ′tQ
−1Xt)
−1
Vb = Vβ(Vβ
−1β +
T∑
t=1
X ′tQ
−1yt)
Is(β) is an indicator function used to denote that the roots of β lie outside the unit circle.
The conditional posterior of Q is:
Q|y, β ∼ IW (Q, vQ)
vQ = vQ + T
Q = Q+
T∑
t=1
(yt −X
′
tβ)(yt −X
′
tβ)
′
12,000 Gibbs sampler draws were taken in total and 2,000 were discarded after burn-in.
The SVAR has 12 lags. The sample is monthly, from March 1994 to December 2016.
Central Bank Communication: Information and Policy shocks62
Appendix H. FEVD results
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(a) Baseline (b) Policy shock (c) Difference
Figure H.1: Comparison between monetary policy and information shocks
shaded 5%,16%, 84% and 95% percentiles
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(a) Baseline (b) Policy shock (c) Difference
Figure H.2: Comparison between monetary policy and information shocks. 3m federal funds futures
shaded 5%,16%, 84% and 95% percentiles
